Zombie Mouse in a Chinese Room by Nasuto, S.J. et al.
Philosophy and Technology manuscript No.
(will be inserted by the editor)
Zombie mouse in a Chinese room
Slawomir J. Nasuto · J. Mark Bishop ·
Etienne B. Roesch · Matthew C. Spencer
the date of receipt and acceptance should be inserted later
Abstract John Searle's Chinese Room Argument (CRA) purports to demon-
strate that syntax is not suﬃcient for semantics, and hence that because com-
putation cannot yield understanding, the computational theory of mind, which
equates the mind to an information processing system based on formal com-
putations, fails. In this paper, we use the CRA, and the debate that emerged
from it, to develop a philosophical critique of recent advances in robotics and
neuroscience. We describe results from a body of work that contributes to
blurring the divide between biological and artiﬁcial systems: so-called ani-
mats, autonomous robots that are controlled by biological neural tissue, and
what may be described as remote-controlled rodents, living animals endowed
with augmented abilities provided by external controllers. We argue that, even
though at ﬁrst sight these chimeric systems may seem to escape the CRA, on
closer analysis they do not. We conclude by discussing the role of the body-
brain dynamics in the processes that give rise to genuine understanding of the
world, in line with recent proposals from enactive cognitive science1.
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1 Searle's Chinese Room Argument
1.1 The CRA in a nutshell
In developing the Chinese Room Argument in his paper `Minds, Brains and
Programs' (MBP) [Searle(1980)] John Searle gave birth to one of the most no-
torious debates in the history of philosophy of mind [Cole(2009),Preston and Bishop(2002)].
Searle's argument refutes the strong claim of artiﬁcial intelligence, which he
coined Strong AI, that of creating a truly intelligent computational device,
demonstrating machine understanding [Searle(1980), p. 417]. This lasting de-
bate has important consequences for cognitive science in general, and the
computational theory of mind in particular, which equates the mind to an
information processing system based on formal computations [Fodor(1975),
Fodor(1987),Putnam(1988)]. If Searle's position in the debate is correct, it
also shows the inadequacy of any purely behavioural procedure (e.g. Turing's
`test') to identify intelligence2.
In 1977, Schank and Abelson published information on a script3 based
software system that they had developed to answer questions on simple sto-
ries [Schank and Abelson(1977)]. The program takes as input a simple story
and, using sets of rules, heuristics and scripts, is able to infer answers to
questions about the story posed by an operator. Searle gives the example
of a story depicting a man entering a restaurant, ordering a hamburger and
storming outside the restaurant disappointed. If asked Did the man eat the
hamburger?, the program would unequivocally answer No, he did not, based
on its script outlining the typical expected behaviour exhibited by customers
visiting restaurants.
In the CRA, by demonstrating that syntax is not suﬃcient for semantics,
Searle responds to the claim that the appropriately programmed computer
genuinely `understands' the data it processes; for example, the claim that
Schank and Abelson's software actually understands the text it processes. To
this end, Searle described a thought experiment in which he was locked in a
room, and provided with `a large batch of Chinese writing'. As Searle does
not speak a word of Chinese, to him these Chinese ideographs were just so
many meaningless squiggles (ibid. p. 418). Searle is then presented with a
second batch of Chinese script together with a set of rules [which Searle can
understand] for correlating the second batch with the ﬁrst batch. Some time
later Searle is subsequently given:
... a third batch of Chinese symbols together with some instructions,
again in English, that enable me to correlate elements of this third batch
2 In what has become known as the standard interpretation of the Turing test, a human
interrogator, interacting with two respondents via text alone, has to determine which of
the responses is being generated by a suitably programmed computer and which is being
generated by a human; if the interrogator cannot reliably do this then the computer is
deemed to have passed the Turing test.
3 In their work Schank and Abelson used scripts to specify a detailed description of
stereotypical events unfolding through time in given contexts.
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with the ﬁrst two batches, and these rules instruct me how to give back
certain Chinese symbols with certain sorts of shapes in response to
certain sorts of shapes given me in the third batch.
Unbeknownst to Searle:
... the people who are giving me all of these symbols call the ﬁrst
batch a script, they call the second batch a story and they call the
third batch questions. Furthermore, they call the symbols I give them
back in response to the third batch answers to the questions and the
set of rules in English that they gave me, they call the program.
Now just to complicate the story a little, imagine that these people
also give me stories in English, which I understand, and they then
ask me questions in English about these stories, and I give them back
answers in English. Suppose also that after a while I get so good at
following the instructions for manipulating the Chinese symbols and
the programmers get so good at writing the programs that from the
external point of view, that is, from the point of view of somebody
outside the room in which I am locked, my answers to the questions
are absolutely indistinguishable from those of native Chinese speakers.
Nobody just looking at my answers can tell that I don't speak a word
of Chinese.
Let us also suppose that my answers to the English questions are,
as they no doubt would be, indistinguishable from those of other na-
tive English speakers, for the simple reason that I am a native English
speaker. From the external point of view  from the point of view of
someone reading my answers  the answers to the Chinese questions
and the English questions are equally good. But in the Chinese case,
unlike the English case, I produce the answers by manipulating unin-
terpreted formal symbols. As far as the Chinese is concerned, I simply
behave like a computer; I perform computational operations on for-
mally speciﬁed elements. For the purposes of the Chinese, I am simply
an instantiation of the computer program.
Thus Searle's rulebook describes a procedure which, if carried out accu-
rately, allows him to participate in an exchange of uninterpreted symbols -
squiggles and squoggles - which, to an outside observer, look as though Searle
is accurately responding in Chinese to questions in Chinese about stories in
Chinese; in other words, it appears as if Searle, in following the rule book, ac-
tually understands Chinese, even though Searle trenchantly continues to insist
that he does not understand a word of the language.
According to Bishop [Bishop(2004)], the central claim of the CRA is that
computations alone cannot in principle give rise to understanding, and that
therefore computational theories of mind cannot fully explain human cogni-
tion. [...] And yet it is clear that Searle believes that there is no barrier in
principle to the notion that a machine can think and understand; [...] Searle
explicitly states, in answer to the question `Can a machine think?', that `the
answer is, obviously, yes. We are precisely such machines' .
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Searle's intuition pump, a term coined by Dennett [Dennett(1991)], pro-
voked an intense reaction in the AI community who attempted, but arguably
failed, to demonstrate that the CRA was wrong. What have emerged as per-
haps the most important criticisms, which Searle anticipated in the original
exposition of the CRA, are those Searle termed the systems reply, the robot
reply and the Brain Simulator reply. Even in the original exposition of the
CRA, Searle took these criticisms seriously, presciently anticipating several
key turns in recent cognitive robotics, AI and cognitive science.
In the more than thirty years since its ﬁrst publication there has continued
to be lively interest in the CRA4; as Bishop [Bishop(2009)] observes:
.. in a 2002 volume of analysis [Preston and Bishop(2002)] comment
ranged from Selmer Bringsjord who observed the CRA to be arguably
the 20th century's greatest philosophical polarizer [Bringsjord(2002)],
to Rey who claims that in his deﬁnition of Strong AI Searle burdens
the [Computational Representational Theory of Thought (Strong AI)]
project with extraneous claims which any serious defender of it should
reject [Rey(2002)]. Nevertheless, although opinion on the argument
remains divided, most commentators now agree that the CRA helped
shift research in Artiﬁcial Intelligence away from classical computa-
tionalism (which, pace Newell and Simon [Newell(1976)], viewed in-
telligence fundamentally in terms of symbol manipulation) ﬁrst to a
sub-symbolic neural-connectionism and more recently, moving even fur-
ther away from symbols and representations, towards embodied and
enactive approaches to cognition. Clearly, whatever the verdict on the
soundness of Searle's Chinese room argument, the subsequent historical
response oﬀers eloquent testament to his conclusion that `programs are
not minds'.
This paper is not an attempt to buttress the CRA. In what follows, we will
brieﬂy review the `System' and `Robot' replies, before introducing a number
of successes in a new branch of robotics that contributes to blurring the divide
between biological and artiﬁcial systems. We aim to use these examples to
articulate a response to current trends in cognitive robotics in line with Searle's
position as espoused in the CRA. To cut to the gist, we show that if the CRA
holds then it also holds against both cognitive robotics and bio-machine hybrids
(animats) [as currently engineered].
1.2 The systems reply
The systems reply originated from researchers who took a bird's eye view
of Searle's thought experiment. To them, understanding does not lie within
Searle, but within the system as a whole. That is, the room plus Searle, plus
4 Cf. [Rapaport(2006)], [Waskan(2005)], [Sprevak(2005)], [J.(2004)], [Freeman(2003)],
[Freeman(2004)], [Overill(2004)], [Garvey(2003)] etc.
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the rulebook, plus the sheets of paper [on which are inscribed the various
squiggles and squoggles], as it is all these things - the system - as a whole that
exhibits the responses perceived as Chinese. Searle responds to this by pointing
out that, even if he internalised [memorised] the rulebook and all the paper
squiggles and squoggles, and hence interacted with the native Chinese speakers
directly, laboriously following the instructions of the rulebook as memorised,
he would still not understand a word of Chinese.
1.3 The robot reply
The robot reply acknowledges that understanding requires some degree of
interaction with the world. Proponents of this position extend the CRA to a
robot that interacts with the world through actuators, and `perceives its world'
through appropriate sensors. Using a procedure similar to Searle's rulebook,
a computer decides the appropriate symbolic control signals (squoggles) in
response to the symbolic descriptions of the world (squiggles) that its sensors
present; surely in this case the robot, interacting with the world appropriately
at all times, could be said to genuinely `understand'. . .
However, by making what is now a well rehearsed move, Searle once again
claims that as both the squiggles and squoggles remain merely uninterpreted
symbols, a series of binary digits, they would remain meaningless to him as he
followed the instructions in the rule book and controlled the robot's behaviour;
in other words, that Searle in controlling the robot via the rule book would
understand nothing of the robot's interactions with the world and thus - as
there is nothing a computer would have that Searle, scraps of paper and rule
book do not - neither would the robot.
In other words, the situation Searle describes highlights that, in merely
executing its control program, it would always fail to obtain the intimate
connection with the world required to give rise to genuine intentional states,
genuine understanding and genuine meaning.
1.4 The Brain Simulator reply
The third reply assumes an accurate computer model of the neural mechanisms
at play in the brain of a native Chinese speaker, as they respond to questions
in Chinese about a story in Chinese. Advocates of this move in the debate
assert that to deny genuine understanding to a hi-ﬁdelity neural simulation
would be tantamount to denying understanding to the native Chinese speakers
themselves.
Searle responds to this proposal by suggesting a replacement of the neurons
and synapses with a complex functional analogue [of the neural simulation
of the native Chinese speaker's brain] constructed from an interconnection of
water-pipes and valves, each of which he would activate according to a rulebook
upon receiving a speciﬁc series of squiggles as input and then, contingent upon
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speciﬁc ﬂows at the output of this water-pipe network, the rule book would
specify which Chinese ideographs to output. Perhaps not surprisingly, Searle
once again concludes that, to him [and the network of pipes], the Chinese
ideographs remain meaningless.
2 Hybrid systems and levels of embodiments
The replies to Searle's thought experiment describe situations that are both
relevant and conceivable: each situation emphasises particular perspectives of
the CRA, and could give rise to further investigation in the form of actual
physical/biological experiments with tangible implementations. Today's pro-
ponents of so-called embodied AI, a ﬁeld now known as cognitive robotics,
take at least some of Searle's comments seriously in that cognitive robotics
acknowledges that mere syntactical manipulation of uninterpreted symbols is
insuﬃcient for understanding and emphasises the importance of embodiment
in intelligent action [Pfeifer(2001)]. This work has employed extremely varied
strategies, the success of which, however, remains debatable [Roesch(in press)].
Interestingly, a fourth line of reply to the CRA (Searle calls the `combi-
nation reply') involves a mix of the previous three replies. In this particular
situation, one assumes the examination of a robot in the world, operated by a
synthetic brain modelled after a native Chinese speaker. Searle agrees with the
contenders of this line of thought: I entirely agree that in such a case we would
ﬁnd it rational and indeed irresistible to accept the hypothesis that the robot
had intentionality, as long as we knew nothing more about it.. [Searle(1980),
our emphasis]. Once we understood that its behaviour was in fact the result of
a [very complex] rule book, we would retract our initial hypothesis and deny
the system had genuine understanding.
3 Complex rule books
Historically, Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI) practitioners have been incredulous at
the extreme simplicity of the low-level rules described by Searle (and actually
deployed in a famous experimental `recreation' of the CRA by Harré and Wang
[Harré and Wang(1999)]) that simply `correlate one set of formal symbols with
another set of formal symbols `merely by their shape', such that typically
very trivial combinations of un-interpreted symbols - squiggles - map simply
onto others - squoggles. It has always seemed likely to such AI experts that
any machine understanding program with a claim to real-world generality
would require a very large and complex rule-base (program), typically applying
very high-level rules (functions)5 and make extensive use of internal variables
5 In contrast to the thirteen basic ideographs deployed by Harré and Wang, IBM's WAT-
SON system - which recently won world wide acclaim as rivalling the greatest human players
of the USA TV game show `Jeopardy' - eﬀectively deployed a complex high-level rule book
(literally thousands of complex algorithms working in parallel) on the full gamut of natural
human language.
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(`pieces of paper' onto which the man in the room [Searle] can scribble symbols
and deﬁne internal `representations').
However, it is equally clear from `Minds, Brains and Programs' [Searle(1980)]
that Searle intended the CRA to be fully general - applicable to any conceiv-
able [now or future] AI program (grammar-based; rule-based; neural network;
Bayesian etc): `I can have any formal program you like, but I still understand
nothing '. So if the CRA succeeds, it must succeed against even the most com-
plex `high-level' systems.
So, in a spirit of cooperation (between computer scientists, AI practitioners
and Searle) let us consider a more complex formal program/rule book-system
which has (as one high-level-rule) a call to, say, Google-translate. We suggest
that these `internal representations' scribbled on bits of paper, used by the
man in the room (monoglot Searle), could now maintain [at least partial]
interpretations of the [unknown] Chinese text, as `symbol-strings-in-English'.
In this way it is plausible that, via a process analogous to one's gradual
understanding of a Chinese text via the repeated use of a Chinese-English
dictionary, the application of [grounded] high-level-rules (Google-translate) to
Chinese text would, over time, foster the emergence of genuine semantics and
understanding in even a monoglot English speaker like Searle. Because both
the rule book and any internal representations the rule book requires (Searle's
`scribbles on paper') are encoded in English, and ex hypothesisi Searle brings to
the room an understanding of English, we suggest, after Boden [Boden(1988)],
that over time this extended English Reply would lead to the emergence of
genuine semantics for Searle.
But does a computer Central Processing Unit6 (CPU) really `understand'
its program and its variables [encoded as raw binary data] in a manner anal-
ogous to Searle's understanding of his rule book and internal-representations
encoded in English? In her 1988 paper (ibid) Maggie Boden suggests that,
unlike say the human-driven manipulations of formal logic, it does; because,
unlike the rules of logic, the execution of a computer program `actually causes
events to happen (e.g. it reads and writes data [or instructions] to memory
and peripherals)' and such `causal semantics' enable Boden to suggest that it
is a mistake to regard [executing] computer programs as pure syntax and no
semantics; such a CPU processing Chinese symbols really does have a `toe-
hold' on [Chinese] semantics. The analogy here is to Searle's understanding of
the English language rule book and hence the [extended, high-level] English
reply holds.
In the `Philosophical Investigations' Wittgenstein points out [Wittgenstein(1958)]
that there is a fundamental diﬀerence between normative rule-following and
acting in accordance with rules (obeying physical laws). In contrast to Bo-
den, we assert that the execution of a computer program is merely acting
in accordance with physical laws; the CPU does not understand its internal-
6 A CPU is the core component of a computer system that executes program instructions
(its algorithm or rule book) by physically, and in most modern computers typically elec-
tronically, fetching or storing (reading or writing) them to and from memory and evaluating
their coded commands.
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representations [as it executes its program and input] any more than water in
a stream `understands' its ﬂow down hill; both are processes strictly entailed
by their current state and that of the environment (their `input').
Furthermore, as Cassirer [Cassirer(1944)] suggested, we do not consider the
computer as it executes its program with particular input(s) an `information
processor' with a concomitant `toe-hold in semantics', because we consider
that the [physical] computer does not process rich semantic `symbols' (which
belong to the human realm of discourse), rather mere un-interpreted `signals'
(binary digits [±5V]): objects devoid of meaning which belong to the world of
physics.
All syntax and no semantics7 - as there is no genuine sense in which the
CPU understands its rule book in a manner analogous to Searle's understand-
ing of English, we suggest that a CPU executing its program is simply not
analogous to monoglot-Searle's gradual understanding of a Chinese text via
repeated use of an English/Chinese dictionary.
To reﬂect that the CPU merely mechanically transforms the signals it
processes we simply insist that the rule book is deﬁned only by syntactical
operations (albeit perhaps more complex than the simple `correlations' origi-
nally suggested by Searle and physically deployed by Harré and Wang) and the
internal-representations (`scribbles on paper'), must remain doggedly deﬁned
by meaningless signals (i.e. un-interpreted symbols; aka Searle's `squiggles and
squoggles').
It is clear that, even allowing the rule book to deploy high-level calls to, say,
Google-translate, no understanding of the underlying Chinese text can ever
emerge because the `internal-representations' Searle is forced to manipulate
remain uninterpreted (`squiggles and squoggles'). The process is analogous to
monoglot Searle's frustrated attempts to understand an unknown Chinese text
using only a Chinese dictionary.
4 On epistemology and ontology
In further reﬂection on the System reply to the CRA, John Haugeland [Haugland(2002)]
asks why we should accept Searle's conclusion that the internalised Chinese
subsystem doesn't understand Chinese given that its responses to the Chi-
nese questions are correct and indistinguishable from those a native Chinese
speaker may give:
What we are to imagine in the internalization fantasy is something
like a patient with multiple personality disorder. One personality,
Searle, is ﬂuent in English (both written and spoken), doesn't know
a word of Chinese, and is otherwise perfectly normal (except that he
has the calculative powers of a mega idiot savant). The other ostensible
personality - let's call him Hao - is ﬂuent in Chinese (though only writ-
7 Syntax is not the same as, nor by itself is it suﬃcient for, semantics, [Searle(1992)].
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ten, not spoken), has no English, and, moreover, apart from seeming to
be able to read and write, is deaf, dumb, blind, and paralyzed.
Why, exactly, should we conclude that Hao doesn't understand the
Chinese that he appears to be reading and writing (automatically, as
it were)?
Haugeland suggests Searle's internalisation response equivocates on the use
of the word `in' and subsequently deduces that Searle is not entitled to assert
that, `were Hao to understand Chinese, so would [Searle]'; hence Haugeland
claims Searle's internalisation response to the System reply is simply not log-
ically sound.
4.1 Phenomenal aspects of understanding
To unpack Haugeland's claim, let us compare the responses of the two systems
- Hao and Searle - in the case where Searle ﬁrst listens to a joke in Chinese
and then in English. In the former case, although Searle may make the right
linguistic responses in Chinese, he will never `get the joke' and `feel the laugh-
ter' because he, John Searle, still doesn't really understand a word of Chinese;
whereas in the latter case he may well `get the joke', ﬁnd it funny and laugh
because he really does understand English. In other words, the behaviour will
not entail understanding, but the understanding will entail the appropriate
behaviour.
Similarly, for all a small child may laugh at a sequence of adult jokes, she
will not feel the laughter appropriately and hence will not really understand
the jokes. In other words, there is a fundamental `diﬀerence in kind' (an onto-
logical distinction) between these two cases. This is perhaps not so surprising
as in the former case ex hypothesi as Searle-as-Hao is merely carrying out
ungrounded, uninterpreted symbol manipulations; whereas in the latter case
Searle's command of his native tongue is grounded by consciousness of his
body and his interactions with the world and society.
In the absence of any linguistically-grounding `conscious sensations of laugh-
ter' accompanying Searle's execution of the Hao program, we doubt that by any
normal use of the word `understand' anyone can, legitimately, claim Searle-
as-Hao understands the Chinese story anymore than the young child `under-
stands' adult jokes; demonstrably [in this case] mere outward behaviour alone
is not suﬃcient to tease apart the two situations.
Hence we suggest that there is a fundamental ontological (contra epis-
temological) distinction between Searle-as-Hao and Searle-as-native-English-
speaker; a diﬀerence that cannot be teased apart by mere observation of exter-
nal behaviour alone and that, following Strawson8, this conscious diﬀerence is
central to the notion of what it really means to `understand' and to `think'.
8 A closely allied position is also endorsed by Horgan and Tienson
[Horgan and Tienson(2002)].
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But if the CRA is correct and the mere computer simulation of a neural
network is not suﬃcient for understanding, perhaps the addition of a biological
neural network would overcome the CRA? We now argue that recent techno-
logical advances, which contribute to blurring the divide between biological
and artiﬁcial systems, may serve as a vehicle to push this examination further.
In particular, we focus on so-called animats [Franklin(1997),Wilson(1985)],
autonomous robots that are controlled by biological neural tissue, and what
may be described as remote-controlled rodents, living animals endowed with
augmented abilities provided by artiﬁcial controllers. These two chimeras can
be seen as the two sides of the same coin and, we argue come a step closer to
the physical realisation of the well known brain-in-a-vat thought experiment,
cousin to the CRA. If correct, our position reinforces Tom Ziemke's distinction
between strong and weak embodiment [Ziemke(2001)] and suggests that the
former is fully necessary for understanding.
5 Robots and animats
Recently, one of the co-authors led a team at the University of Reading
that successfully developed an autonomous robot controlled by cultured living
neural cells [Warwick et al(2010a)Warwick, Nasuto, Becerra, and Whalley,?].
The brain of the system consisted of a cultured network of thousands of
neurons, sliced from the cortical tissue of foetal rats, and grown on an array of
electrodes that permits both recording and electrical stimulation. As a result
of the procedure, the connections between the neurons are lost, but within a
short period of time, new connections spontaneously form, and neurons start
engaging in communication. The activity grows over the subsequent weeks into
bursts of activity that spread over the entire culture until maturation (about
1 month after seeding). The resulting activity was then used to control the
actuators of a small wheeled robot and, closing the loop of the system, the
signal registered by the robot's sensors was being fed back to the cultured
neurons in the form of brief electrical impulses. This platform demonstrated
simple obstacle avoidance behaviours9, analogous to a simple Braitenberg ve-
hicle [Braitenberg(1984)], and the a posteriori analysis of the cultures showed
functional connectivity, as well computational and biophysical properties sim-
ilar to that of intact brains.
5.1 Programming rodents
In recent years, successes in implant technology gave rise to functional hybrid
systems integrating artifacts with the nervous systems of living organisms. Ef-
forts in this direction are motivated by the creation of prostheses, e.g. cochlear
[Blake(2000)] or retinal [Fornos et al(2011)Fornos, Sommerhalder, and Pelizzone,
Zrenner(2002)] implants, and are now moving beyond augmenting sensory
9 See www.youtube.com/watch?v=1-0eZytv6Qk.
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modalities towards interfacing directly with the brain through deep brain
stimulation. This technique involves implanting tiny electrodes in nuclei of
the brain, permitting the recording and stimulation of local neurons. It is an
approved clinical technique for the treatment of many neurological disorders in
humans [Fins(2004),Kringelbach et al(2007)Kringelbach, Jenkinson, Owen, and Aziz].
Before reaching this stage, however, extensive testing has to be performed on
seemingly simpler brains, like that of rodents. Recently, implant technology
has made huge advances in moving from simple passive electrodes for stimu-
lation to implanting whole electronic circuits capable of performing complex
functions. Berger et al., for instance, successfully demonstrated implants that
replaced a rat's hippocampus during a spatial memory task: when the device
was inactivated, the animal failed the behavioural task; its performance was re-
stored when the device was switched back on [Berger et al(2011)Berger, Hampson, Song, Goonawardena, Marmarelis, and Deadwyler].
Another example comes from John Chapin's group, whose implant coupled
reward and sensory processing areas in an operant conditioning procedure
to train the rat to respond behaviourally to particular tactile stimulations
[Talwar et al(2002)Talwar, Xu, Hawley, Weiss, Moxon, and Chapin]. Upon sev-
eral days of training, the `programmed rodent' was able to follow commands,
henceforth behaving similar to a remote-controlled animal10. See also Gradi-
naru et al [Gradinaru et al(2007)Gradinaru, Thompson, Zhang, Mogri, Kay, Schneider, and Deisseroth],
who used optogenetic techniques to stimulate neurons selectively, inducing mo-
tor behaviour without requiring conditioning.
5.2 From an intuition pump to the physical realisation of thought
experiments
Does our animat, which successfully avoids obstacles, genuinely understand it
is facing a wall? Can the remote-controlled mouse, which turns left in inﬁnite
loops as long as the device is switched on, be said to understand genuinely
what it is doing, and why? How about the remote-controlled rat that blindly
follows motor commands; does it understand the input it receives?
The situations we described, we posit, push Searle's CRA a little bit fur-
ther, permitting the philosophical exploration of the ﬁfth line of reply to the
CRA, that of the robot endowed with a brain much alike to a biological brain.
In these situations, both the animats and what we called remote-controlled
rodents experiments assume some degrees of embodiment and relatedness to
the workings of biological brains. A systems view would thus legitimately raise
the question, to what degree might these chimeras understand their personal
predicament?
Cosmelli and Thompson already paved the way for this line of thought in
an attempt to formulate a response to the brain-in-a-vat thought experiment,
a cousin to the CRA, about consciousness [Cosmelli and Thompson(2011)]. In
this experiment, the reader is invited to imagine a brain ﬂoating in a life-
sustaining vat of liquid nutrients and connected to a supercomputer that
10 See www.youtube.com/watch?v=D5u2IWFNFDE.
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would stimulate it with electrical impulses exactly like those it normally re-
ceives when embodied (p. 361). Cosmelli and Thompson use this thought
experiment to explore the role of the body in the deﬁnition of consciousness.
Notably, they pose that a functional body is required to support conscious-
ness, and that such a body needs to be a self-regulating system comprising its
own internal, homeodynamic processes and capable of sensorimotor coupling
with the outside world (p. 363), a conception at the heart of the enactive
approach to cognitive science, and conclude that consciousness is a function
of life-regulation processes involving dense couplings between neuronal and
extraneuronal systems, rather than a function of neural systems alone (p.
379).
We argue that, even though their interest in this thought experiment lies
in the deﬁning features of consciousness, their argument might as well apply
to intentionality. In fact, as an analogue of Cosmelli and Thompson's brain-
in-a-vat, we suggest that the impoverished notion of a body that serves
the animat equally oﬀers no hope for anything more than mere sensorimotor
coupling to arise.
The lack of proper embodiment is, however, only part of the problem, as
demonstrated by the remote-controlled rodent experiments. In these cases, the
chimera is constituted by a fully functional, living body that is endowed with
an artiﬁcial device that transmits electrical signals to the brain, to which it
responds. The crux of this paper is that behaviorally, the remote-controlled
animals seem to lose something more than just free-will and volition.
This is because there is no element of the animal's intrinsic makeup that
would cause it to behave of its own accord in a way similar to that imposed
onto it by the experimenter, and hence it is extremely unlikely that it would
ever acquire understanding of such externally imposed behaviours11. This is
in spite of the fact that, in contrast to an animat, this implanted rodent is
obviously a case of perfect embodiment, though the experimenter artiﬁcially
manipulates the rodent's tissues. These manipulations produce sensory-motor
couplings that result in the rodent experiencing the world consistent with the
induced actions.
The fundamental ﬂaw is that these induced couplings would not be the
eﬀect of the intrinsic nervous system's constraints (metabolic or otherwise) at
any level. To the contrary, they are the cause of metabolic demands; demands
that are incurred through the experimenter's manipulations. Since the exper-
imenter drives the sensorimotor couplings in an arbitrary way (from the per-
spective of metabolic needs of animal or its cellular constituents), the causal
relationship between the bodily milieu and the motor actions and sensory
readings would be disrupted. However, according to the enactive approach,
only the right type and directionality of such couplings can ultimately lead to
understanding and intentionality.
11 Unless the imposed behaviours happened to exactly synchronise with natural behaviours
appropriate to the rodent, given all of its bodily needs and desires, at that point in time.
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The above argument is an elaboration on Cosmelli and Thompson's brain-
in-a-vat critique. A recently proposed synthesis of computational paradigms
oﬀered by the authors [Spencer et al(2013)Spencer, Tanay, Roesch, Bishop, and Nasuto]
puts forward an alternative but complementary argument which also ties in
with the fundamental arguments by Howard Pattee deriving from the cyber-
netic tradition on the nature of symbols in biological systems [Pattee(1995)]
which was also extended towards brain [Cariani(2001)] and higher cognition
[R¡czaszek-Leonardi(2012)]. It appears that the most encompassing concep-
tion of computation [Spencer et al(2013)Spencer, Tanay, Roesch, Bishop, and Nasuto]
performed by any system rests on the existence of internal dynamics that is
capable of generating a ﬂow in the system state space. The most basic impli-
cation of this is that it aﬀords the existence of diﬀerent system conﬁgurations
or states; without such potential there can be no computation of any form
(continuous or discrete, symbolic or distributed). However, dynamics are not
suﬃcient to instantiate computations, since computations require constraints.
It is the constraints that enable the algorithm to `shape' the ﬂow, and an
instantiation of a speciﬁc trajectory starting from a speciﬁc initial condition
corresponds to an execution of a programme. The nature of the state space and
that of constraints will be speciﬁc for the diﬀerent computational paradigms
but they all share in common that the constraints are externally imposed and
are used by the programmer so that the dynamical ﬂow can be meaningfully
interpreted. Thus, the constraints do not have an intrinsic meaning in compu-
tations, the meaning is imposed on them, and only via their skilful use can the
resultant dynamics lead to meaningful results. We posit that, in light of the
above, the manipulations of a neural culture in an animat or even of the brain
in the remote-rat are nothing else but a form of imposing such external con-
straints on otherwise innate (neural) dynamics. Moreover, as such constraints
are not constructed to fulﬁll the properties required of so-called replicable
constraints [R¡czaszek-Leonardi(2012)], they must remain merely formal ma-
nipulations. Whether at the neuronal or cognitive level, replicable constraints
acquire meaning through some selective process rendering them functional at
that level. Thus, both animats and remote rats are merely other examples
of formal computational systems, albeit `implemented' in hybrid (animat) or
biological (remote rat) substrate.
Therefore, we suggest that, even though the remote rat still possesses a fully
functional body and, arguably, a functioning brain, the fact that it receives
alien commands does not warrant a genuine understanding of what is going
on. In other words, the animal's brain receives foreign input that, at best, may
resemble drug-induced decontextualised hallucinations  mere uninterpreted
symbols/squiggles and squoggles  which, we argue, would remain meaningless
despite how accustomed the animal may become to this new mode of owner-less
functioning. The situation is analogous to the alien hand syndrome - where
in such patients, for example, their arm seemingly performs actions not of
their volition or under their control (in fact, often against their will). Such
patients do not accrue any meaning of why their arm acted in this way, albeit
they can see (and hence comprehend) the actions in the same way as any other
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observer; in this sense they are `external observers' of their own limb(s) zombie
movements.
It is thus clear that genuine intentional states, in the process of under-
standing the world, require both a fully functional brain and a fully functional
body; deporting the question of the requirements for genuine understanding
to the deﬁning features of the process whereby the brain and body interact
with the world.
Referring back to our computationalist framework [Spencer et al(2013)Spencer, Tanay, Roesch, Bishop, and Nasuto],
that means that even if one were to describe cognitive agents in computational
terms one is forced to conceive the closest computational analogy of a very
special kind. For these are the systems that are not only, following Pattee
[Pattee(1995)] and R¡czaszek-Leonardi [R¡czaszek-Leonardi(2012)], capable
of supporting replicable constraints at both biological and cognitive level but
which are eﬀectively capable of setting such constraints for themselves, in or-
der to modify their own innate dynamics supporting the `computation'. It is
this self-referential nature of cognitive systems that bootstraps the meaning of
replicable constraints/symbols to the meaning of the computation `executing'
by the innate dynamics constraint in this way. It should be also clear from our
overview of a wide range of computational paradigms discussed in theoretical
computing [Spencer et al(2013)Spencer, Tanay, Roesch, Bishop, and Nasuto] that
none of them comes even close to such a system, all being some forms of formal,
externally driven symbol manipulation.
Without this, neither animats, nor the remote-controlled rodents experi-
ments can escape Searle's CRA. This argument lends support to discussions of
the properties grounding the agent-environment system. Fröese and Ziemke,
for instance, discuss the foundational role of constitutive autonomy and adap-
tivity [Froese and Ziemke(2009)] for agency and sense making, and their con-
sequences for the design of embodied AI.
6 Summary and conclusion
In this paper, we based a philosophical examination of the requirements for
genuine understanding and intentionality on extensions to John Searle's Chi-
nese Room Argument against strong AI. Our deployment of Searle's intuition
pump to recent advances in robotics and neuroscience shows it continues to
have force against the most recent developments in robotics and bio-machine
hybrids. Speciﬁcally, we examined how two new scenarios fare in light of the
CRA's typical replies from the AI community. We focused on so-called ani-
mats, autonomous robots that are controlled by biological neural tissue, and
what may be described as remote-controlled rodents, living animals endowed
with augmented abilities provided by artiﬁcial controllers. These two chimeras
can be seen as the two sides of the same coin, and herein we have demonstrated
that neither of these systems can be said to exhibit any genuine understanding
of the world.
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In addition, we argue that current eﬀorts in cognitive robotics, to endow
robots with abilities to represent the world and reason about it, are limited.
In line with the rise of enactive cognitive science - which proposes an en-
larged perspective that includes the closed-loop interactions of a life-regulated
body-brain dynamical system with an evolving world - we deem inappropriate
cognitivism and its concomitant computational theory of mind, and instead
emphasise the role of foundational processes such as autonomy, exploration,
autopoiesis and social embedded-ness, in giving rise to a genuine understand-
ing of our lived world.
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